Deterrence and Diplomacy: Maleeha Lodhi

 As for Pakistan's future, internal difficulties affect the country's security. It can be ignored only when there is a great danger to the nation. However, the country's external security challenges have not diminished since its founding. This put it in a permanent state of emergency.  Pakistan's history and structured geography have always prioritized protecting the country from external threats. This problem is further complicated by disputed borders left behind by colonial rule. There aren't many books on how the country's nuclear capability has affected its external security. Director Feroz Khan's film Eating Grass mainly focused on Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability and nuclear history. Also how Pakistan was prevented from controlling nuclear fuel and left a loophole for the role of diplomacy. Zamir Akram's new book The Security Imperative: Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy covers nuclear diplomacy in depth. It further shows that diplomacy has played a crucial role in securing a credible nuclear deterrent for Pakistan's security. The main theme of his book is the security-based nature of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. In the first chapter, geography and history affected national security. India's hostility has shaped its security philosophy. Initially, Pakistan's security was ensured through a military alliance. However, this did not stop India from acting aggressively in 1971. In 1974, India's nuclear explosion forced Pakistan to seek nuclear energy as a security guarantee. Pakistan's security situation has worsened due to its geographical location. It also gave the region a temperamental neighbourhood with challenges coming from Afghanistan. This book describes Pakistan's diplomatic maneuvers to protect its nuclear and missile programs. Akram remembers how the US punished Pakistan after India's nuclear blast. US efforts, such as the Glenn, Symington, and Solarz amendments, were primarily aimed at preventing Pakistan from using its nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan's demilitarized nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada and France were abandoned under US pressure. Pakistan was then forced to continue its secret nuclear bomb program. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan took advantage of its close relationship with the United States to develop its nuclear energy. American pressure was kept at bay as long as they did not share technology or conduct a nuclear test. Pakistan received aid due to US arms embargo laws. It also contributes to Pakistan's nuclear resources. When the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan in 1990, Russia withdrew from Afghanistan. Islamabad argued that Pakistan's unilateral actions are not conducive to regional non-proliferation. It conducted cold tests and switched from uranium-based to plutonium-based nuclear weapons. Akram describes Pakistan's diplomatic efforts in the 1990s. In addition, he made several regional non-proliferation proposals for India and the United States. He describes the developments related to our nuclear diplomacy in the chapter "The Roller Coaster".

After Benazir Bhutto became prime minister, the cold relations between Pakistan and the United States improved. During the Prime Minister's trip to Washington, President Bill Clinton became convinced that the capital needed to reevaluate its policies. Clinton admitted that withholding the money and the F-16 from Pakistan was unfair. Then the Pressler regulation was changed. The restriction of financial aid to Pakistan was lifted and all military equipment was released. As the Brown amendment progressed, Clinton sought a unilateral nuclear concession from Pakistan as a compromise to support the amendment. Pakistan will not limit its nuclear bomb program in exchange for the arrival of the F-16. "Pakistan's national security was indisputable," said army chief Waheed Kaker at a meeting in Washington. The Brown Amendment was later passed and economic sanctions were lifted. Akram talks about US-Pakistan negotiations before and after Pakistan's nuclear tests. Later chapters deal with the 2005 Indo-US nuclear deal and its impact on Pakistan. It also clearly appreciates Pakistan's response and plan to achieve "total deterrence by 2011". Pakistan's bilateral and multilateral nuclear diplomacy contains many useful insights. Nuclear power is important to Pakistan as a means of deterring foreign aggression. An important conclusion of the book is that nuclear deterrence cannot meet Pakistan's internal challenges. This, in turn, can weaken the threat.